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I. Introduction
The global crisis of 2008–2009 focused attention on the role of fi scal pol-
icy at times of collapsing aggregate demand. Concerns about experienc-
ing a reincarnation of the great depression induced the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (high- income group) 
and emerging market countries to invoke extraordinary policies for ex-
traordinary times. Countries adopted sizable fi scal stimuli, augmented 
by unprecedented monetary expansions supported by elastic swap 
lines between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and 
between the Fed and four emerging markets. The fl ight to quality and 
the shortage of dollar liquidity posed a special challenge for emerging 
markets, inducing them to supplement these policies with both large 
sales of foreign currencies at the height of the crisis and with sizable 
depreciations. 
Yet there has been a remarkable heterogeneity in the magnitudes of 
the fi scal stimuli, and of the exchange rate depreciation. The differen-
tial patterns of response are traced in table 1, summarizing the fi scal 
stimulus/GDP and the depreciation rate in 32 countries, chosen by data 
availability. The fi rst three columns overview the crisis related fi scal 
stimulus / GDP, 2009–2011, in OECD countries and emerging markets. 
The crisis led to a signifi cant fi scal stimulus in the United States, Japan, 
and Germany, the magnitude of which increased from 2009 to 2010, 
refl ecting various lags associated with fi scal policy. The fourth and the 
fi fth columns report the massive “bailout” transfers to the banking sys-
tem in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom that at-
tempted to stabilize the fi nancial panic. It is noteworthy that the size of 
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the transfers to the fi nancial system exceeded the direct fi scal stimuli in 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Similar trends, though in varying 
intensity, were observed in other OECD countries. 
China, South Korea, and Russia provided front loaded fi scal stimu-
lus at rates that were well above that observed in most OECD coun-
tries. Notable is the greater agility of the emerging markets’ response 
relative to that of the OECD countries, refl ecting possibly faster policy 
response capacity of several emerging markets. The deeper safety net 
of the OECD (unemployment insurance, food stamps, social security, 
socialized medical care, etc.) provides automatic stabilizers that work 
to cushion the economy in addition to the  crisis- related stimulus. Dolls, 
Fuest, and Peichl (2010) reported, 
We fi nd that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income 
shock in the EU, compared to 32 per cent in the U.S. In the case of an unemploy-
ment shock 47 percent of the shock are absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per 
cent in the U.S. This cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabili-
zation of up to 30 per cent in the EU and up to 20 per cent in the U.S. There is 
large heterogeneity within the EU. Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern 
Europe are much lower than in Central and Northern European countries. (1) 
In contrast, emerging markets with a more limited safety net but with 
larger fi scal space tend to benefi t by a more aggressive  crisis- related 
fi scal stimulus, compensating partially for the absence of deeper social 
insurance.
In this paper we study the response heterogeneity of countries dur-
ing the crisis, indentifying the associations of economic structure (trade 
openness, fi scal capacity, etc.), the size of fi scal stimuli, and the ex-
change rate depreciations during the crisis. A useful theoretical anchor 
predicting such heterogeneity is the neo- Keynesian open economy, 
as predicted by the Meade’s (1951a, 1951b) framework. The textbook 
Meade model implies that at times of collapsing aggregate demand, 
economies that are more closed (or less open) should opt for a larger 
fi scal stimulus and should opt for larger fi scal stimuli, and should rely 
less on exchange rate depreciation (e.g., Blanchard 2008).1 Trade open-
ness implies lower fi scal multipliers, as a share of the stimuli would 
“leak.” Trade openness may also increase the relative potency of ex-
change rate depreciation (relative to the fi scal stimulus) in mitigating 
the drop in demand for exportable goods, acting as a demand switching 
policy, whereby the improved competitiveness of a country increases 
the demand for net exports.2 
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Fiscal policy is predicated on fi scal space and fi scal capacities. While 
the notion of fi scal space is fuzzy, it deals with the degree to which a 
country has the ability to fund a fi scal stimulus without a sizable in-
crease in the real interest rate.3 The presumption is that public debt 
overhang (like higher public debt/GDP) reduces the ability to fund 
fi scal stimuli. Indeed, public debt/GDP has been frequently used by 
the literature and by policymakers as an important indicator for the 
soundness of policies, and as a measure of exposure to confi dence cri-
ses. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) warned that debt- to- GDP ratios over 
90% are associated with lower growth.4 Similarly, the Maastricht criteria 
imposed thresholds of public debt/GDP below 60%, and fi scal defi cit/
GDP below 3% as criteria for joining the Euro. 
While these ratios are easy to track, we question the degree to which 
the normalization of public debt and fi scal defi cit by the GDP is an ef-
fi cient way of comparing and measuring fi scal capacities across coun-
tries and across time. A given ratio of the public debt/GDP, say 60%, is 
consistent with ample fi scal space in countries where the average tax 
collection is about or above 50% of the GDP, as is the case in France, 
Germany, and in most northern European countries. The same public 
debt ratio is associated with a limited fi scal space in countries where 
the average tax collection is about or below 25%, as has been the case in 
developing countries, emerging markets, and the South- Western Euro 
Area Peripheral (SWEAP) countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain). Instead of a normalization of public debt and fi scal defi cit 
by the GDP, we contend that the tax revenue as a share of the GDP, 
averaged across the business cycle, provides a more effi cient way of 
normalizing macro public fi nance data. 
Specifi cally, we point out that the tax collection/GDP, averaged to 
smooth for business cycle fl uctuations, provides key information on the 
availability of the tax revenue to support fi scal policy. We defi ne this 
ratio as the (de facto) tax base: short of a drastic change in tax rates 
and tax enforcement, the tax base provides a concise summary of the 
tax capability. The (de facto) tax base refl ects both the ability and the 
willingness of a country to fund fi scal expenditure and transfers. Across 
countries, we fi nd that the de facto tax base is more stable than public 
debt/GDP, and public debt/GDP normalized by the de facto tax base 
is more volatile than public debt/GDP (see the coeffi cient of variations 
reported at the bottom of table 3). The public debt/GDP normalized by 
the de facto tax base is subject to greater cross country variation, and 
provides a more robust explanation for the scale of fi scal stimuli. Es-
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sentially, the public debt/GDP normalized by the de facto tax base mea-
sures the average tax years that it would take to “buy” the outstanding 
public debt, and provides a stock measure of public debt overhang. We 
view this measure as a more fundamental metric for fi scal space, as it 
links the public debt to the resources the public sector can mobilize 
without drastic change of the social contract. Consequently, we defi ne 
the de facto fi scal space by the inverse of the average tax- years it would 
take to repay the public debt. 
It is noteworthy that if changing government expenditure and taxes 
are equally costly, our focus on de facto fi scal space would be question-
able. For example, a high level of tax revenue could be interpreted as 
leaving little room to raise taxes, thus counting negatively toward fi scal 
space, unlike our interpretation. Our presumption is that the costs of 
changing the tax rates and their enforcement are high relative to the 
lower political costs of changing the public debt/GDP and the fi scal 
defi cit/GDP. Thus, the tax base depends on structural factors that are 
harder to modify in the short run than adjusting government expendi-
ture. This view is consistent with recent empirical literature fi nding that 
tax compliance and individuals’ willingness to pay taxes is affected by 
perceptions about the fairness of the tax structure. An individual tax-
payer is infl uenced strongly by his perception of the behavior of other 
taxpayers (see Alm and Torgler 2006 and the references therein). If tax-
payers perceive that their preferences are adequately represented and 
they are supplied with public goods, their identifi cation with the state 
increases, and thus the willingness to pay taxes rises (Frey and Torgler 
2007). In a  follow- up work (Aizenman and Jinjarak 2011), we studied 
the relationship between the tax base and income inequality. We found 
that the Gini coeffi cient is negatively associated with the size of the tax 
base/GDP. This implies that changing taxes may be diffi cult in polar-
ized countries. While all these factors are endogenous in the long run, 
they are mostly predetermined in the short run—the time that the poli-
cymaker determines in an unanticipated recession the implementation 
of fi scal stimuli. In a companion paper, we also study the usefulness of 
the de facto fi scal space measures by showing that they account better 
for sovereign spreads of countries than the more conventional public 
debt/GDP (Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak 2011).5 
We use the precrisis de facto fi scal space and structural controls to 
account for the patterns of fi scal stimuli and exchange rate adjustments 
during the crisis, validating the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) 
approach. We fi nd that higher public debt/average tax base is associated 
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with lower fi scal stimulus, and greater trade openness is robustly associ-
ated with a lower fi scal stimulus and a higher depreciation rate during 
the crisis. A one standard deviation increase of the public debt/average 
tax base lowers the size of the fi scal stimulus by about 2% of the GDP. A 
one standard deviation increase of trade openness increases the nominal 
depreciation during 2007–2009 by about 7 percentage points. 
Section II reviews the heterogeneity of the fi scal stimulus and of the 
exchange rate adjustment during the crisis window. We also investigate 
the patterns of de facto fi scal capacities in 123 countries, a sample cho-
sen by data availability. Section III overviews selectively the literature 
on fi scal multipliers. Section IV applies the precrisis de facto fi scal space 
measures and other controls in a regression framework, accounting for 
the heterogeneity of the fi scal stimuli and of the exchange rate adjust-
ments during the crisis. We also describe in this section the relevance 
of the de facto fi scal space in explaining sovereign spreads. Section V 
concludes. 
II.  Assessment of the De Facto Fiscal Space Prior to the 
Crisis (2006)
Insight regarding fi scal space is provided by tracing the precrisis 2006 
public debt/GDP as a fraction of the precrisis average tax revenue/
GDP during 2000–2005. To recall, the early 2000s were viewed as the 
continuation of the blissful “Great Moderation”—a period character-
ized by a drop in macroeconomic volatility and risk premium during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.6 The precrisis average tax revenue/GDP 
measures the de facto tax capacity in years of relative tranquility. 
The top half of fi gure 1 reports the average tax- years needed to repay 
the public debt measure of 123 countries, subject to data availability 
in 2006. We obtain this measure by dividing the public debt/GDP in 
2006 by the average tax revenue/GDP during 2000–2005. It shows the 
wide variation in the average tax- years needed to repay the public debt, 
from well below one year in Australia (indicating a high fi scal space), 
to about fi ve years in Argentina, and above eight years in Bhutan (indi-
cating a very low fi scal space). For most of the countries in our sample, 
the tax- years it would take to repay the public debt in 2006 were below 
fi ve years. The bottom half of fi gure 1 reports another measure of fi s-
cal tightness, focusing on fl ows instead of stocks (i.e., on fi scal defi cits 
instead of public debt): the fi scal defi cits/GDP in 2006 relative to the 
average tax revenue/GDP. 
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Figure 1 is consistent with the notion that, even without increas-
ing the tax base, a fair share of countries had signifi cant fi scal space in 
2006.7 The presumption is that a lower precrisis public debt/GDP rela-
tive to the precrisis tax base (i.e., higher de facto fi scal space) implies 
greater willingness to fund fi scal stimuli using the existing tax capacity. 
Fig. 1. Fiscal space by country in 2006
Notes: A, the fi scal space is calculated from public debt as of 2006 and 2000–2005 average 
tax/GDP; B, the fi scal space is calculated from fi scal balance as of 2006 and 2000–2005 
average tax/GDP.
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We apply these concepts in order to explain the  cross- country variation 
in the fi scal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis.
To track the adjustment of fi scal capacity across countries, the top 
half of fi gure 2 also reports our main fi scal space measure, the debt/
GDP normalized by the average tax revenue/GDP, by country groups. 
Lower precrisis public debt/GDP, lower public debt/average tax base, 
and lower fi scal defi cits relative to the average tax base imply greater 
fi scal capacity. The fi gure shows that fi scal space was weakest (highest 
levels of public debt/average tax base) in the low and  middle- income 
countries. Although fi scal space measures are stronger in the SWEAP 
countries than in low- and  middle- income countries, its debt/GDP ra-
tio is higher. Generally, the SWEAP countries had more limited fi scal 
space during the tranquil period than other OECD countries—higher 
average public debt relative to the tax base, and a higher level of public 
debt to GDP. The lower panel of fi gure 2 provides similar measures of 
the fi scal defi cit/GDP and fi scal defi cit/tax base.
Some developments of the debt/tax base after 2006 are worth men-
tioning. High- income OECD and non- SWEAP Euro countries expe-
rienced an increase in the debt/tax base ratios of about 0.2 between 
2006 and 2010. For SWEAP countries, the deterioration in fi scal circum-
stances was dramatic: the government debt of Ireland climbed from 
25% of GDP in 2007 to 93% of GDP in 2010, while the government debt 
of Greece went from 95% to 130% of GDP. As a result, the public debt/
average tax base ratio of Ireland jumped from 0.9 to 3.1, and that of 
Greece from 3.0 to 4.1, sharply diminishing their ability to conduct a 
discretionary fi scal policy. The large increase of the debt/tax base ratios 
in both countries captures a high degree of distress in their economic 
fundamentals, and the socialization of private banks’ liabilities in Ire-
land.
Figure 3 provides the histograms of the average tax collection/GDP, 
public debt/GDP, public debt/GDP moralized by the average tax base, 
and the fi scal balance/average tax base of countries in the sample, 
based on public debt and the fi scal balance of 2006, and the average tax 
base of 2000–2005. The top left panel of the fi gure shows that the distri-
bution of the tax base is tri- modal, approximately at 15, 25, and 35% of 
GDP. The top right panel suggests the average public debt of 50 to 60% 
of GDP. The bottom left panel shows that most of the public debt/aver-
age tax base observations are well below fi ve, with the majority around 
two. The fi scal balance/average tax base in the bottom right panel indi-
cates that this variable is approximately centered around zero.
Fig. 2. Average 2000–2006 fi scal space by region
Notes: A, the fi scal space is calculated from public debt as of 2006 and 2000–2005 average 
tax/GDP. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. B, the fi scal space 
is calculated from fi scal balance as of 2006 and 2000–2005 average tax/GDP.
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We conduct fi rst a descriptive analysis of the  between- period stabil-
ity for the key variables in table 2. Specifi cally, we are interested in the 
relative stickiness of the average tax/GDP, public debt/GDP, and the 
public debt/average tax base between the 1993–1999 and the 2000–2006 
periods, within each country in the sample. To have a representative 
comparison, we do this exercise for countries with at least three years 
of observations in both periods; this leaves us with 80 countries. We cal-
culate the mean of these variables for each period, perform a t- test for 
each country, and report the signifi cant (5%) results by country groups 
as well as the total. The total number of countries with a signifi cant 
change of the average tax base/GDP over the decades is 66, slightly 
larger than the number of countries with a signifi cant change of public 
debt/GDP, 58. A majority of countries sees a drop of average tax base/
GDP (34 decline versus 29 increase), while the number of increases and 
decreases of the public debt/GDP are not as markedly different. In to-
tal, within country over the decade, the public debt/average tax base is 
more volatile than the public debt/GDP. 
Table 3 provides the mean, standard deviation, median, and coef-
fi cient of variation for the same sample of 80 countries. The mean tax 
base is 24% of GDP, while the mean public debt is 60% of GDP. The 
mean public debt is 300% of the average tax base (3 tax years). The 
Fig. 3. Histograms of fi scal space 2006
Note: The fi scal space is calculated from public debt and fi scal balance as of 2006 and 
2000–2005 average tax/GDP.
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 cross- country coeffi cient of variation confi rms that the public debt/av-
erage tax base is subject to a sizably greater variation than the public 
debt/GDP (0.74 versus 0.56). 
III. Fiscal Multipliers in the Open Economy—Literature Overview
Before turning to the regression analysis, we place the paper in the con-
text of the evolving literature on fi scal policy at times of distress. Text-
book analysis of fi scal stimulus in a closed economy suggests that an 
increase in government expenditure on goods and services in a closed 
economy would deliver a greater benefi cial stimulus if 
It would not crowd out private sector activities. 
It would not increase interest rates, and would not raise concerns about 
the future fi scal and monetary stability of the country.
It would target projects with high social marginal product, and would 
take place before the onset of the recovery, contributing thereby toward 
shortening the recession. 
Fiscal stimulus in an open economy involves further considerations, 
as the incipient appreciation under a fl exible exchange rate with capital 
Table 3 
Mean and Dispersion of Fiscal Space Components
Tax/GDP (%)
Period  Countries Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Coeffi cient 
of Variation
1993–1999 80 23.98 11.11 20.05 .46
2000–2006 80 23.94 11.48 21.37 .48
1993–2006 80 23.96 11.26 20.33 .47
Public Debt/GDP (%)
1993–1999 80 60.79 34.19 55.38 .56
2000–2006 80 58.18 32.85 53.45 .56
1993–2006 80 59.49 33.45 55.16 .56
Public Debt/Tax (%)
1993–1999 80 314.87 234.05 246.75 .74
2000–2006 80 302.76 226.83 233.37 .75
1993–2006 80  308.82 229.83  239.69 .74
Note: The fi scal space is calculated from public debt as of 2006 and 2000–2005 average 
tax/GDP.
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mobility may induce crowding out of export demand. Under a fi xed 
exchange rate with capital mobility, fi scal policy tends to involve posi-
tive spillover effects, inducing higher demand for imports and incipient 
monetary expansion. These considerations imply that, at times of global 
recession, a properly coordinated fi scal expansion would mitigate most 
exchange rate appreciation concerns, inducing mutually reinforcing 
positive spillover effects that increase the ultimate stimulus. Similar 
considerations apply to a fi scal stimulus in the form of transfer income.
Fiscal skeptics worry frequently about crowding out, and the grow-
ing costs of a prolonged fi scal stimulus. As there is no way to conduct 
controlled experiments regarding these key issues, views about the size 
of fi scal multipliers diverge. Conventional wisdom has been that de-
veloping countries have limited fi scal space—their limited tax capacity 
and possibly sizable debt overhang imply that a fi scal stimulus may 
backfi re by increasing the interest rate and the risk premium facing the 
country, inducing down the road an Argentinean vintage 2000–2002 
type funding crisis. The deeper taxation capacity of the OECD coun-
tries suggests wider fi scal space. However, the growing debt overhang 
associated with lucrative safety nets, unfunded liabilities, aging popu-
lation, and demographic transitions may crowd out most of the fi scal 
space of OECD countries. These considerations suggest that, while a 
 short- term fi scal stimulus following a deep crisis would be supported 
by most OECD countries, a prolonged fi scal stimulus would induce 
a vigorous debate that probably would constrain policymakers. These 
dynamics have been played out vividly in the years following the 2008–
2009 global crisis.
The literature pointed out the diffi culty in calculating the net fi scal 
multipliers, as there is no simple way to control the “fi scal experiment.” 
The estimates of the fi scal multipliers vary, depending on the methodol-
ogy, period, and controls applied (see Barro and Redlick 2009; Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009). More recent work found that the 
size of the multiplier varies considerably over the business cycle: be-
tween 0 and 0.5 in expansions and between 1 and 1.5 in recessions (see 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2010). Applying the history of the United 
States during World War II, Gordon and Kerrn (2010) inferred that 
when capacity constraints are absent across the economy, the fi scal mul-
tiplier is about 1.8, higher than most previous estimates. While useful, 
these studies focused mostly on the experience of the United States and 
the OECD countries. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2010) asked related 
questions applying relatively comprehensive quarterly data, covering 
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20 high- income and 24 developing countries. Using the variation of-
fered by this rich data, they estimated fi scal multipliers for different 
groups of countries. They found that the economies operating under 
predetermined exchange rate regimes have long- run multipliers that 
are relatively large (higher than one), but economies with fl exible ex-
change rate regimes have essentially zero multipliers. The response of 
central banks to fi scal shocks is crucial in assessing the size of fi scal 
multipliers. Economies that are relatively closed to trade have long- run 
multipliers exceeding one, but relatively open economies have negative 
multipliers. A high outstanding debt of the central government (exceed-
ing 60% of GDP) was associated with zero  short- term and negative 
long- term fi scal multipliers. Sovereign debt ratios above 60% of GDP 
were associated with negative long- run effects of fi scal stimulus.
The Ilzetzki et al. (2010) results are consistent with the neo- Keynesian 
open economy framework, allowing for the complications associated 
with partial fi nancial integration due to sovereign risk, and the limited 
substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. The adverse effects of 
a fi scal stimulus under a fl exible exchange rate are consistent with the 
crowding out of aggregate demand associated with a fi scal stimulus in 
economies close to full employment, or without the proper accommo-
dation of monetary policy. Similarly, the adverse effects of trade open-
ness on the fi scal multiplier are in line with the neo- Keynesian open 
economy “linkage channel.” While the Ilzetzki et al. (2010) sample pe-
riod ends before the crisis, their results suggest that during the global 
crisis of 2008–2009, countries with lower debt overhang, lower infl a-
tion, and lower trade openness would have benefi ted more by a sizable 
fi scal stimulus. A lower debt overhang should mitigate the adverse im-
pact of debt fi nancing on the interest rate. Lower infl ation would allow 
greater monetary accommodation to mitigate any crowding out effects. 
Smaller trade openness would increase the domestic impact of a given 
fi scal stimulus. While at times of full employment a fi scal stimulus un-
der a fl exible exchange rate induces appreciation, during the global cri-
sis of 2008–2009, the deleveraging propagated by the United States led 
to depreciation pressures that impacted most countries. The collapsing 
global demand mitigated most infl ationary concerns related to depre-
ciation, tilting the balance toward a greater willingness to depreciate in 
order to improve competitiveness. 
These considerations suggest that during the crisis of 2008–2009, 
closer economies, or countries with greater fi scal space, would opt for a 
larger fi scal stimulus. Opener countries or countries with more limited 
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fi scal space would opt for a smaller fi scal stimulus and larger exchange 
rate depreciation. We turn now to empirical tests of these and related 
hypotheses. We test the degree to which the  cross- country variation in 
actual fi scal stimuli confi rms the predictions of the MF framework.
IV. Fiscal Space, Exchange Rate Adjustment, and Fiscal Stimuli
We apply both public debt/GDP and public debt/GDP normalized 
by the average tax base concepts in order to explain the  cross- country 
variation in the fi scal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis. 
Recall that fi gure 2 suggests that in 2006, the  middle- income countries’ 
fi scal space was higher than that of the low- income countries. While the 
precrisis debt overhangs (i.e., the 2006 public debt/GDP) of the low and 
lower middle income countries were slightly above the other groups, 
their ratios of the public debt/GDP to the average tax base were much 
higher than that of most the OECD countries (5.94, 3.70, and about 1.5, 
respectively). This in turn implies that the low- and  middle- income 
countries have had smaller fi scal space than most Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Consequently, the fi scal stimuli 
of the richer countries would have the side benefi t of helping the poorer 
countries in invigorating the demands facing lower income countries. 
Based on data availability of 123 countries, we present in table 4 the 
regression analysis, accounting for the  cross- country variation in the 
fi scal stimulus during 2009–2011. The explanatory variables are the 
public debt/GDP and the de facto fi scal space. We begin with these 
two explanatory variables in the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation in columns (1) and (2). The OLS results show that neither 
public debt/GDP nor public debt normalized by the average tax base 
can explain the size of fi scal stimuli. Since there are only 30 or so coun-
tries that have a nonzero fi scal stimulus, the OLS method may not be 
appropriate.
Next we conduct the Tobit estimation (left censoring at zero fi scal 
stimulus). To account for a potential correlation among countries in 
each income group, the  cross- section estimation is done by clustering at 
income group levels (according to the World Bank’s income classifi ca-
tion). The results in columns (3) and (4) of table 4 indicate that a higher 
public debt/average tax base is negatively and signifi cantly associated 
with the size of the fi scal stimuli, whereas the public debt/GDP is not. 
Lowering the 2006 public debt/average tax base from the average level 
of low- income countries (5.94) down to the average level of the Euro–
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SWEAP countries (1.97) increases the crisis stimulus in 2009–2011 by 
2.78 GDP percentage points. However, studying the size of the pledged 
fi nancial sector bailouts relative to GDP, we fi nd that public debt/GDP 
(and not public debt/tax base) is positively and signifi cantly associ-
ated with the size of fi nancial bailouts. While the sign of the coeffi cient 
estimates is sensible for the public debt/tax base and counterintuitive 
for the public debt/GDP, the baseline regression can be improved by 
dealing with omitted variable biases, and with concerns that the public 
debt/tax base and the public debt/GDP are endogenous to other vari-
ables. 
Table 5 explains the size of fi scal stimuli using a larger set of variables. 
To account for the political capacity and for the role of fi scal policy in 
the open economy, columns (9) and (10) report the Tobit estimation with 
the state fragility variable8 and trade openness/GDP. The effects of the 
public debt/average tax base and the public debt/GDP are similar to 
those in table 4. In addition, the size of the fi scal stimuli is negatively 
and signifi cantly associated with the state fragility and trade openness/
GDP. That is, stronger states and closer economies have applied a larger 
fi scal stimulus during 2009–2011.
Columns (13) and (15) report regression results where public debt/
average tax base and public debt/GDP are instrumented by lagged 
economic fundamentals. These fundamentals are trade openness, fi -
nancial openness, real GDP per capita, growth rate of total real GDP, 
government share of real GDP per capita, and legal origins.9 For ex-
ample, in equation (15), the public debt/average tax base (Debt %Tax) 
is the endogenous regressor, instrumented by variables in equation (16). 
These regressions also have a decent explanatory power, accounting for 
about 23% of the variations across countries in the public debt/GDP, 
and about 38% in the public debt/tax base. The coeffi cient of the in-
strumented public debt/GDP in (13) has a negative sign, so does the 
coeffi cient of the instrumented public debt/tax base. Both the public 
debt/tax base and the public debt/GDP are statistically signifi cant at 
the 1% level.
The bottom half of table 5 reports regressions studying jointly the 
size of fi scal stimuli and the size of fi nancial bailouts. To account for a 
possible sample selection bias, we fi rst run the probit estimation of the 
fi scal stimulus on the instrumented public debt/GDP, on state fragility, 
and on trade openness (column [17]), and similarly for the fi nancial 
bailout in column (18). Then we estimate the seemingly unrelated re-
gression of fi scal stimuli and fi nancial bailout as dependent variables 
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(columns [19] and [22]). The results indicate that, when both variables 
are explained jointly, the size of fi scal stimuli can be explained by either 
the public debt/GDP or the public debt/tax base. Yet, the fi nancial bail-
outs are not explained well by these variables. 
We can now provide the economic signifi cance of the public debt/
GDP and the public debt/tax base in the  cross- country estimates, re-
gressions (19) and (22) of table 5. For each explanatory variable, we 
multiply its standard deviation with the estimated coeffi cient in the re-
gression to approximate the effect of its one standard deviation change 
on the size of the fi scal stimulus. The calculation suggests that the size 
of the stimulus in 2009–2011 is larger in countries with larger de facto 
fi scal space and lower trade/GDP. A decrease in the public debt/aver-
age tax base revenue by one standard deviation (248% of GDP) implies, 
all other things being equal, an increase of the fi scal stimulus during 
2009–2011 by .009 ∙ 248 = 2.232% of GDP. 
To gauge the role of exchange rate adjustment, fi gures 4 and 5 report 
the marginal impact of one standard deviation change of the public 
debt/tax base, the public debt/GDP, and the trade/GDP on the size of 
fi scal stimulus. In both fi gures, we provide also the realized deprecia-
tion. Figure 4 reports the effects of fi scal space and trade openness on 
the fi scal stimulus size by country groups categorized by the magnitude 
of exchange rate adjustment during 2007–2009, whereas fi gure 5 reports 
these effects by income groups. In fi gure 4, for the fi rst group (59 coun-
tries), their exchange rates appreciated in the range of –21.8, 0.0, where 
negative means appreciation. For the second and third groups (27 and 
26 countries in each, respectively), their exchange rates depreciated in 
the range of .03, 10.1 and 10.5, 94.9, respectively. For the third group 
(largest depreciation countries), a one standard deviation increase of 
debt/tax base (Debt %Tax base) lowers the size of fi scal stimulus by 
2.79% of the GDP—the effect that is larger than 2.46% of the GDP on the 
stimulus of the fi rst group (appreciation countries), as well as 1.94% of 
GDP of the second group (moderate depreciation). Consequently, coun-
tries displaying higher depreciation during 2007–2009 were also subject 
to a larger negative economic effect of their debt/tax base on the size 
of fi scal stimulus. This is consistent with substitutability between fi scal 
space and depreciations. However, when countries are ordered by their 
income groups, as shown in fi gure 5, it is less clear whether the fi scal 
stimulus and the realized exchange rate adjustments are substitutes or 
complements.
Since the fi scal stimuli and the exchange rate adjustments may be de-
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termined by some common factors, it is important to study them jointly. 
Panel A of table 6 estimates these two dependent variables simulta-
neously. The table reports the  cross- country singularly unrelated re-
gresssions (SUR) estimation results with the size of stimulus (or bailout) 
and depreciation as the two dependent variables. Because the explana-
tory variable set cannot be the same for both dependent variables in the 
SUR, we adjust some variables accordingly. Positive depreciation (0/1) 
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the exchange rate depreciated 
cumulatively from January 2007 to December 2009. Euro countries (0/1) 
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is a member of the 
Eurozone. Probability of a positive outcome is estimated from the pro-
bit regression of a stimulus incidence (1 if stimulus, 0 if none) on fi scal 
space, state fragility, and trade openness. Column (25) focuses on the 
Fig. 4. Economic signifi cance on the size of crisis fi scal stimulus %GDP, whole sample
Notes: We categorize countries into three groups. For the fi rst group (59 countries), their 
exchange rates did appreciate from Jan. 2009 to Dec. 2010 in the range of –21.4, 0.0%. For 
the second and third groups (27 and 26 countries), the exchange rates depreciated cumu-
latively in the range of .3, 6.7% and 7.2, 50.7%, respectively. This fi gure reports the eco-
nomic effects of a one standard deviation increase in Debt/GDP (equation [19]), Debt/Tax 
base (equation [22]), and Trade/GDP (average of equations [19] and [22]) on the size of 
fi scal stimulus of 2009–2010. For the third group (largest realized depreciation countries), 
a one standard deviation increase of debt %tax base lowers the stimulus by 1.67% GDP.
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marginal impact of public debt/average tax base and trade openness. 
As before, we fi nd that the fi scal stimuli is negatively associated with 
trade openness. The interaction between trade/GDP and a depreciation 
dummy (equal to 1 if depreciation in 2007–2009) suggests that higher 
trade/GDP is associated with larger depreciation. The results support 
the substitutability between fi scal space and depreciations.
We conduct a number of robustness checks in panels B and C of 
table 6. We run a horse race between our fi scal space measure—debt/
tax and the conventional measure—debt/GDP in columns (27) and (28) 
of table 6.B. The results show that debt/tax has a stronger effect on 
the size of fi scal stimulus than debt/GDP. Next, in columns (29) and 
(30) we run two separate regressions for years 2009 and 2010 and fi nd 
supportive evidence to our main results. In order to control for the fact 
that some countries were hit harder than others, we add trade and fi -
nancial exposure to the United States, and terms of trade and unem-
ployment to the estimation. This is done in table 6, panel C, columns 
Fig. 5. Cumulative 2009–2010 nominal depreciation (%) and economic signifi cance on 
the size of crisis fi scal stimulus %GDP, by income group.
Note: This fi gure reports the economic effects due to a one standard deviation increase 
of Debt/GDP (equation [19]), Debt/Tax base (equation [22]), and trade openness/GDP 
(average of equations [19] and [22]). The depreciation are actual (realized), while the rest 
are estimated effects. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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(32) and (34)—we fi nd that the effect of fi scal space is robust to these 
controls. To account for the issues of borrowing in foreign currency, 
we add External Debt/GDP to the estimation of panel C in columns 
(31) through (34). Controlling for external debt, we continue to fi nd the 
effect of fi scal space on the size of fi scal stimulus. In addition, we also 
fi nd that higher trade exposure (as measured by the export to the US/
GDP) and terms of trade deterioration are associated with larger depre-
ciation. We also check whether our fi ndings depend on whether we use 
 trade- weighted exchange rate depreciations or dollar based ones. This 
is done in panel C, columns (33) and (34). Using the  trade- weighted 
exchange rate depreciations, subject to data availability, we still fi nd 
consistently the associations between openness, fi scal space, and the 
size of fi scal  stimulus. 
Figure 6 provides the economic signifi cance of the  cross- country es-
timates in regressions (columns [23] and [25] in table 6, panel A). For 
Fig. 6. Economic signifi cance on the size of crisis fi scal stimulus %GDP of 2009–2010 
and the size of 2009–2010 nominal depreciation (cumulative, %).
Notes: This fi gure reports the economic effects due to a one standard deviation increase 
of Debt/GDP (equation [23]), Debt/Tax base (equation [25]), Trade openness/GDP (aver-
age of equations [23] and [25]), infl ation (average of equations [23] and [25]), and foreign 
reserves/GDP (average of equations [23] and [25]).
330 Aizenman and Jinjarak
each explanatory variable, we multiply its standard deviation with the 
estimated coeffi cient in the corresponding regression, approximating 
the effect of its one standard deviation change on the size of the fi s-
cal stimulus. The size of the stimulus in 2009–2011 is larger in coun-
tries with larger fi scal space and lower trade/GDP, while the extent 
of nominal depreciation is greater in countries with higher trade/GDP 
and lower foreign reserves/GDP. The negative effects of public debt/
GDP and public debt/tax base on the size of the fi scal stimuli are simi-
lar (though the latter performs better in various econometric specifi ca-
tions), shrinking the  crisis- related fi scal stimulus by approximately 2% 
GDP. An increase of trade openness by a one standard deviation (0.5) 
is associated with a higher cumulative depreciation during 2007–2009 
of 6.8 percentage points. An increase of international reserves by a one 
standard deviation is associated with lower cumulative depreciation 
during 2007–2009 of 3.1 percentage points.
Finally, table 7 illustrates the key importance of the de facto fi scal 
space (i.e., the public debt/GDP normalized by the tax base) in explain-
ing the dynamics of CDS (credit default swap) spreads and SWEAP 
pricing differentials. Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2011) estimate 
the dynamics and structure of CDS pricing over the 2003–2010 sample 
period; the dependent variables are sovereign CDS spreads of  three- , 
fi ve- , and ten- year maturities.10 This is done in a dynamic panel regres-
sion:  !yit = !yit−1 + !x
/
it + !εit; where y is the CDS spread, i stands for 
country and t for year, and x is a vector of controls. Our objectives are 
threefold. We determine whether CDS spreads are related to fi scal space 
measures in a panel regression setting, whether there is an identifi able 
dynamic pattern to CDS spreads during the crisis period, and we inves-
tigate pricing differentials of CDS spreads in the Euro and the SWEAP 
countries, compared to other countries. We seek to answer whether 
SWEAP CDS spreads follow the same pattern as the rest of the world, 
and the degree to which they were “mispriced,” especially during the 
2010 European debt crisis. 
In order to investigate CDS pricing dynamics during the global and 
European fi nancial turmoil, we included time dummy variables for 
three crisis years: 2008 is identifi ed as the year of the global fi nancial 
crisis, 2009 is identifi ed as a partial recovery period, and 2010 is identi-
fi ed with the SWEAP debt crisis and post- global fi nancial crisis. The 
top panel of table 7 reports the differential pricing for Eurozone and the 
bottom panel for the SWEAP countries. We also include interactions of 
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a dummy for Eurozone and SWEAP countries with the time dummy 
variables. 
The sample covers a panel of 54 countries with CDS spreads from 
2003 to 2010. The estimation methodology follows the  Arellano- Bond 
dynamic panel estimator, which accounts for the correlation of a lagged 
dependent variable and the unobserved error terms. The dependent 
variable is 100 × ln(sovereign spreads), allowing the coeffi cients to be 
interpreted in terms of a percentage change of sovereign default risks 
(this terminology also aligns with standard practice in the fi nancial 
sector that discusses the percentage change of CDS spreads). In all of 
the CDS spread regressions, the de facto fi scal space measure (higher 
value is equivalent to lower fi scal capacity) is positive and statistically 
signifi cant at the 1% level—higher level of debt/average tax base in-
creases signifi cantly the pricing of the sovereign default risk. Given the 
mean 10- year CDS pre–2008 of 96 basis points, a one standard devia-
tion increase (2.5) of the debt/tax base ratio increases the 10- year CDS 
spread by 2.5 × 30% × 96 = 72 basis points. A decline in US interest 
rates increases CDS spreads across the maturity spectrum—an impor-
tant factor during our sample period since the US 10- year government 
bond yield dropped from 4.0 percentage point in 2007 to 1.7 percent-
age points at the end of 2010. The test statistics (p- values reported) also 
indicate that these dynamic panel regressions perform reasonably well 
on the whole sample.11 
In addition, all of the coeffi cients on the 2008–2010 year dummy vari-
ables are economically large and statistically signifi cant. Controlling 
for other factors, sovereign spreads in 2008 jumped by 41 to 47% over 
the maturity spectrum, relative to average rates over the 2003–2010 pe-
riod. Spreads were relatively higher in 2009 than precrisis. Spreads fell 
sharply in 2010, again across the maturity spectrum, reaching average 
levels below the conditional period average, once controlling for the 
deteriorating debt situation and declining US interest rates.
For Euro countries (table 7, upper panel), and particularly the SWEAP 
group (lower panel), sovereign spreads rose substantially more in 2008 
compared to the international average. SWEAP CDS spreads climbed 
41 to 68% above the average spreads prevailing in 2008, declined mod-
estly in 2009, and jumped to very high levels above the average in 2010. 
Given the mean of CDS spreads of non- SWEAP countries at pre–2008 
level, the SWEAP CDS spreads were 165.1% (≡ 85 basis points) higher 
than the sample average in 2010 at the  three- year maturity; 126.3% (≡ 90 
basis points) higher at the fi ve- year maturity; and 125.8% (≡ 104 basis 
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points) higher at the 10- year maturity. The Euro area, driven in large 
part by the CDS spreads in the SWEAP group, experienced a similar, 
but less extreme, pattern. It is evident that the sovereign default risk in 
the Euro area, and the SWEAP group in particular, were priced much 
higher than the average of other countries, and moved in the opposite 
direction to the international trend in 2010. Risk assessments were 
 falling in 2010 but rose sharply in the Euro area and in the SWEAP 
group. The public debt/average tax base appears to be the key funda-
mental in accounting for the sovereign risk dynamics. Aizenman et al. 
(2011) consider the broader role played by the public debt/tax base and 
other economic fundamentals in the evolution of CDS spreads as well 
as structural changes due to the global debt crisis of 2008 to the present.
V. Concluding Remarks
We show the importance of precrisis fi scal space in accounting for 
the fi scal stimulus during 2009–2011. We also fi nd that higher trade 
openness had been associated with a smaller fi scal stimulus, and with 
greater exchange rate depreciation. Economically, these effects are large: 
a one standard deviation increase of the public debt/average tax base 
lowers the size of the fi scal stimulus by 2% of GDP. A one standard 
deviation increase of trade/GDP increases the extent of nominal depre-
ciation by about 7 percentage points. A possible interpretation is that 
a higher public debt/average tax base reduces the supply elasticity of 
funds facing the treasury, thereby reducing the viability of a countercy-
clical fi scal policy. As fi scal multipliers tend to be lower in more open 
countries, these countries opted for a smaller fi scal stimulus, putting 
greater weight on adjustment via exchange rate depreciation (“export-
ing their way to prosperity”). Overall, these results are consistent with 
the neo- Keynesian open economy framework, and with the importance 
of fi scal space in measuring the viability of countercyclical policies. 
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Endnotes
Prepared for the NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, June 2011, Malta. 
We are grateful to the insightful comments of the discussants, Menzie Chinn and Fran-
cesco Giavazzi, and from Jeff Frankel, Jorge Braga de Macedo, Assaf Razin, Andy Rose, 
and the conference participants. All errors are ours. For acknowledgments, sources of 
research support, and disclosure of the authors’ material fi nancial relationships, if any, 
please see http: // www.nber.org/chapters/c12498.ack.
1. See Meade (1951a, 1951b); Fleming (1962); Mundell (1963); Dornbusch (1980); and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for important steps in the evolving neo- Keynesian open econ-
omy model.
2. Needless to say, these considerations ignore the externalities imposed by these 
 trade- offs on other countries, increasing the potential role of global coordination in miti-
gating “beggar- thy- neighbor” attitudes.
3. Heller (2005) defi ned it “as room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its fi nancial 
position or the stability of the economy.” Ghosh et al. (2011) defi ned “fi scal fatigue” as a 
situation where government’s ability to increase primary balances cannot keep pace with 
the rising debt.
4. See Irons and Bivens (2010) for a critical review of this result.
5. Note also that a country’s fi scal space is not independent of the assumptions about 
growth and the real rate of interest, themselves possibly endogenous with respect to taxes 
and spending. These factors should play a more pertinent role in explaining the long- run 
patterns of government spending and growth, and are overlooked by our study as we 
focus on the fi scal stimuli in the fi rst two years following the events of 2007–2008.
6. See Stock and Watson (2002) for analysis of the Great Moderation hypothesis. Recent 
observers refer to 1987–2007 as the “Great Moderation” period.
7. This inference is in line with Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), fi nding that the pro-
jected fl ow cost of public debt is low for about half of the OECD countries. 
8. The variable takes on the value of 0–25; where 25 = extreme fragility. The scores are 
based on security, political, economic, and social dimension at the end of the year 2009.
9. See Besley and Persson (2009) for the role of legal origins on fi scal capacities.
10. Our CDS data set contains one- to ten- year maturities. We focus on  three- , fi ve- , 
and ten- year in this table, and our baseline estimates focus on the ten- year maturity. 
While there is no precise international account of government debt maturity, recent sta-
tistics suggest that the average original maturity of central government debts is around 
ten years for both emerging markets and industrial countries (Bank for International 
Settlements [BIS] 2010). See Aizenman et al. (2011) for further details.
11. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions has a null hypothesis of exogenous 
instruments; in all cases, corresponding p- values of the Sargan test cannot reject the 
null. The AR(1) test has a null of no autocorrelation in fi rst differences and the AR(2) 
test has a null of no autocorrelation in levels; in all cases, the test cannot reject that aver-
age autocovariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 (AR(1)) is 0. The Sargan test provides 
some level of confi dence that the residuals are uncorrelated with a group of explanatory 
variables.
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